RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CORPORATE FRAUD IN BRAZILIAN BANKS

Authors

  • Júlio César Gomes Mendonça Universidade Federal de Goiás
  • Michele Rílany Rodrigues Machado Universidade Federal de Goiás
  • Ercilio Zanolla Universidade Federal de Goiás
  • José Alves Dantas Universidade de Brasília (UnB)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22561/cvr.v32i3.6831

Keywords:

Related Party Transactions, Corporative Fraud, Propping, Tunneling

Abstract

Related-party transactions are transactions that auditors, shareholders and academics fear may be carried out in a way that diverges from their true financial purpose. The literature regards related-party transactions as a proxy for an opportunity to commit fraud. Corporate fraud can be best understood when analyzed by the Cressey Fraud Triangle (1953). The purpose of this article is to determine whether related-party transactions have an effect on the likelihood of corporative fraud occurring in publicly-traded Brazilian banking institutions. This was determined through an estimate of logistic random effects regression based on data from 24 publicly-traded Brazilian banks in the period from 2010 to the second quarter of 2019. Our main result confirmed that related-party transactions make it more probable that corporate fraud will occur and the type of transaction that proved to be significant was propping [proprietary (¨prop¨) trading]. It can be concluded that ¨propping¨ transactions (involving liabilities) can take place in several ways or for various reasons and it should not be assumed that all the transactions are carried out for fraudulent purposes. The results of the study suggest that that there is an increased likelihood of fraud in the companies studied. The concerns of the auditors are justified and this study makes a research contribution on the impact made by the related- party transactions on the entities.

Author Biographies

Júlio César Gomes Mendonça , Universidade Federal de Goiás

Mestre em Ciências Contábeis - UFG.

Michele Rílany Rodrigues Machado, Universidade Federal de Goiás

Doutora em Administração – UNB, Professora da Universidade Federal de Goiás – FACE/UFG.

Ercilio Zanolla, Universidade Federal de Goiás

Doutor em Ciências Contábeis – UnB/UFPB/UFRN, Professor da Universidade Federal de Goiás - FACE/UFG.

José Alves Dantas, Universidade de Brasília (UnB)

Doutor em Ciências Contábeis, Professor da Universidade de Brasília (UnB).

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Published

2021-12-10

How to Cite

MENDONÇA , J. C. G. .; RODRIGUES MACHADO, M. R.; ZANOLLA, E.; DANTAS, J. A. RELATED-PARTY TRANSACTIONS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF CORPORATE FRAUD IN BRAZILIAN BANKS. Contabilidade Vista & Revista, [S. l.], v. 32, n. 3, p. 195–216, 2021. DOI: 10.22561/cvr.v32i3.6831. Disponível em: https://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/contabilidadevistaerevista/article/view/6831. Acesso em: 21 nov. 2024.