O NÍVEL DE ALAVANCAGEM COMO CONDICIONANTE DO PROCESSO DE CAPTURA REGULATÓRIA EM SETORES DE UTILIDADE PÚBLICA
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22561/cvr.v35i2.7935Keywords:
Processo regulatório, Alavancagem, Retorno anormal, Utilidade públicaAbstract
The aim is to investigate whether the regulatory capture process is conditioned by the level of leverage in public utility sectors. Originally, the institutional role of regulatory agents should be aimed at achieving social interest, in which services or products can be provided to society at a fair price, and which is the responsibility of the regulator to define it. The perspective of regulatory capture argues that regulation, which should serve the public interest, actually serves the interests of regulated agents. In this line of reasoning, the interest group approach argues that regulation serves the interest of the group that manages to exert greater pressure on the regulator. From a capture perspective, regulation can be captured by the regulated and some aspects of the company, such as leverage can be used by the regulated to pressure the regulator for regulatory decisions favorable to their interests. The sample consisted of companies regulated by price, belonging to the sectors of sanitation, piped natural gas and electricity, in the period from 2007 to 2019. The variables used were: abnormal return (dependent), tariff change, leverage, (independent) and ownership, economic growth, size and sector (controls). The results suggest that the level of leverage, strategically used by the regulated, can enable regulatory decisions that are more favorable to the interests of companies. It was observed that the capture is not generalized, because the tariff change does not explain the abnormal return in an isolated way, but an indicator such as leverage can lead to the capture of the regulatory process.
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