FAMILY PROPERTY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL PERFORMANCE: EVIDENCE OF BRAZILIAN COMPANIES COMPOSING B3 IBRx100 INDEX
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22561/cvr.v31i2.4924Keywords:
Family property, Business performance, Family business, Non-family businessAbstract
This study aims to verify whether there is a significant relationship between family ownership and the performance of Brazilian companies that make up the B3 IBRx100 index. In this research, the sample is formed by 80 companies, composed of 45 non-family members and 35 family members. The data were collected in the Economática® database, and also in the reference form, for the periods from 2012 to 2016. The model applied followed the study by Shyu (2011) and the statistical method used was the modeling of simultaneous panel equations. and descriptive analysis. The hypothesis that there is a significant relationship between family ownership in the performance of Brazilian companies and that there is a degree of ownership that is conducive to optimizing the performance of Brazilian family companies has not been confirmed. The research brings theoretical contributions, as it advances the theme between family business and business performance, when it relates family ownership to economic, financial and market performance, and practice, through evidence to managers that family owned business does not always have an impact results. Although the results contradict some previous empirical studies, the set of empirical evidence from this research should be interpreted with caution, as there is no consensus between family ownership and business performance. It is concluded that family ownership has no influence on business performance.
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