REVELANDO AS COALIZÕES DE ACIONISTAS NO BRASIL
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.22561/cvr.v35i2.7725Keywords:
Shareholders Coalitions, Shareholders' Agreement, Blockholders, Control DistributionAbstract
The strategic interaction between blockholders can be explained by coalition formation. As shareholder coalitions are difficult to observe, shareholder agreements can be used to identify them. In this sense, we describe shareholder coalitions in the Brazilian capital market based on the purpose of shareholders' agreements. The central idea is to show that shareholder agreements characterize different shareholder coalitions and that shareholder coalitions can modify the apparent control structure. To identify shareholder coalitions, we gathered a complete dataset, with information collected manually from 949 shareholder agreements distributed among 382 companies in the period from 1979 to 2019. We used content analysis and portrayed minority protection coalitions and coalitions of control as two main categories of analysis. Minority protection coalitions are formed by the controlling shareholder and a minority shareholder. We assume that these coalitions can favor the monitoring of the investment made by the cooperating minority shareholder. Control coalitions prevail and bring together several blockholders. We believe that these coalitions can be a subterfuge to leverage the power of control. This investigation contributes to the literature on the interaction between blockholders by elucidating the formation of different shareholder coalitions in a context marked by ownership concentration. In addition, it presents several elements that deserve to be considered in future research on the role of shareholder coalitions in corporate governance, which may also be of interest to market agents.
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