PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION IN BRAZILIAN COMPANIES

Autores

  • Yuri Gomes Paiva Azevedo Universidade de São Paulo (USP) http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0830-0214
  • Gislaine Aparecida Santana Sediyama Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)
  • Marcelo Botelho da Costa Moraes Universidade de São Paulo (USP)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.22561/cvr.v32i3.6240

Palavras-chave:

Pay-Performance Sensitivity, Executive Compensation, Firm Performance, Ownership Concentration

Resumo

We examine whether the firm's performance influences executive compensation and how the ownership concentration moderates this pay-performance relationship. Our sample comprises 205 Brazilian companies listed on Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3) with available data between 2010 and 2018. We employ the Generalized Method of Moments with Instrumental Variables (IV-GMM) regressions to control the simultaneity effect of firm performance and executive compensation. Our main results indicate that although the positive influence of firm performance proxies (return on equity and return on assets) on executive compensation, the ownership concentration decrease the pay-performance sensitivity. Thus, our study contributes to the literature by showing that the high level of ownership concentration reduces the propensity of aligning the interests of managers for higher levels of compensation with the interests of shareholders for better firm profitability, not reflecting the recommended practices of corporate governance.

Biografia do Autor

Yuri Gomes Paiva Azevedo, Universidade de São Paulo (USP)

Doutorando em Controladoria e Contabilidade pela Universidade de São Paulo (FEA-RP/USP). Doutorado Sanduíche pela University of Texas (UTEP). Mestre em Ciências Contábeis pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN). Bacharel em Ciências Contábeis pela Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte (UFRN). Membro do Grupo de Pesquisa em Informações Contábeis - InCont (FEA-RP/USP) e do Grupo de Pesquisa em Finanças - GPFin (FEA-RP/USP). Peer reviewer certificado pela Publons Academy. Atua nas áreas de Contabilidade Financeira, Finanças Corporativas e Educação Contábil.

Gislaine Aparecida Santana Sediyama, Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV)

Doutoranda em Controladoria e Contabilidade - Universidade de São Paulo, Professora do Departamento de Administração e Contabilidade da Universidade Federal de Viçosa (UFV).

Marcelo Botelho da Costa Moraes, Universidade de São Paulo (USP)

Pós-Doutorado no Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) na área de Financial Accounting, Professor do Departamento de Contabilidade da Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto da Universidade de São Paulo (USP).

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2021-12-10

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AZEVEDO, Y. G. P.; APARECIDA SANTANA SEDIYAMA, G. .; BOTELHO DA COSTA MORAES, M. . PAY-PERFORMANCE SENSITIVITY AND OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION IN BRAZILIAN COMPANIES. Contabilidade Vista & Revista, [S. l.], v. 32, n. 3, p. 47–72, 2021. DOI: 10.22561/cvr.v32i3.6240. Disponível em: https://revistas.face.ufmg.br/index.php/contabilidadevistaerevista/article/view/6240. Acesso em: 19 nov. 2024.

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v. 32 n. 3 (2021): Volume 32| Número 3| Set./Dez. | 2021

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